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Abstract
We use the Newcomb-Benford law to test if countries manipulate reported data
during the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that democratic countries, countries with
the higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, higher healthcare expenditures,
and better universal healthcare coverage are less likely to deviate from the Newcomb-
Benford law. The relationship holds for the cumulative number of deaths and for
the cumulative number of total cases but is more pronounced for the death toll. The
findings are robust for the second digit tests, for a sub-sample of countries with regional
data, and during the previous swine flu (H1N1) 2009-2010 pandemic.
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1 Introduction
On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the new coronavirus disease
2019 (COVID-19) a pandemic. With tens of millions of confirmed cases and hundreds of
thousands of deaths, this pandemic has spurred by far the largest number of controversies.
Many of them are related to how accurate the data that countries report are. Mass media
around the globe argue that many countries manipulate the data for political or other gains.1
In this paper, we study the association between the accuracy of reported by countries
COVID-19 data and their macroeconomic indicators. Our results show that countries that
are better democracies, have higher income and stronger healthcare systems report more
accurate data. The relationship exists for the cumulative number of confirmed cases and for
the cumulative number of deaths, however, the results are more pronounced for the number
of deaths, indicating that less developed countries are more likely to manipulate mortality
data.
To gauge data accuracy, we use compliance with the Newcomb-Benford law. The Newcomb-
Benford law (NBL) is an observation that in many naturally occurring collections of numbers
the first digit is not uniformly distributed and is likely to be small. One property of the NBL
is that manipulated or fraudulent data deviate significantly from the theoretical NBL dis-
tribution. For its easiness for applications and straightforward approach, the law has been
extensively used to detect fraud and data manipulations. It has been applied to accounting,
finance, macroeconomic, and forensic data to test for data manipulation and fraud. We apply
the Newcomb-Benford law to COVID-19 data for 185 countries affected by the pandemic.
We calculate four goodness-of-fit measures to estimate compliance with the NBL for each
country, and use these measures as proxies for data manipulation.
We then study the relationship between our proxies for accuracy of data and macroe-
conomic indicators of the strength of the economy, democratic institutions, and healthcare
systems. Specifically, we use the regression analysis to find the association between goodness-
of-fit measures and the the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index, the Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) per capita, Healthcare Expenditures as percentage of GDP, and the
Universal Health Coverage Index (UHC).
Studies have shown that countries with weaker democracies and less economically devel-
oped countries are more likely to manipulate data (Adsera et al. (2003), Egorov et al. (2009),
Magee and Doces (2015), Gehlbach and Sonin (2014), and Guriev and Treisman (2019)) and
have lower transparency (Mitchell (1998), Broz (2002), Djankov et al. (2003), Islam (2006),
Lebovic (2006), and Fearon (2011)). Judge and Schechter (2009) analyze the quality of sur-
vey data using Newcomb-Benford law and find that survey data in developing countries is
of poor quality while data from developed countries is of better quality.
Our main hypothesis is thus that countries with weaker democracies, weaker economic
and healthcare systems will have lower data accuracy as measured by the NBL goodness-of-fit
statistic. Our results in many tests support the hypothesis. We find that our four goodness-
of-fit measures (which measure deviations from the theoretical distribution as given by the
NBL) are negatively correlated with macroeconomic indicators (the Democracy Index, GDP,
1See Meyer (2020), Romaniuk and Burgers (2020), Alwine and Goodrum Sterling (2020),
The Economist (2020), Sassoon (2020), Speak (2020), Wood (2020), and Cambell and Gunia (2020),
among others.
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healthcare expenditures, and UHC). The results are true for the cumulative number of cases
and the cumulative number of deaths. We also find the the result is more pronounced for the
reported number of deaths than for the number of confirmed cases. This indicates that, on
average, autocratic regimes and poorer countries are more prone to manipulate death tolls
than the total number of infected.
We conduct a series of robustness tests and find that our results are not driven by
the specific period for which we calculate the goodness-of-fit measures, by small countries,
countries with a small number of cases or deaths, or by countries with extreme deviations
from the NBL. We also show that the same relationship between proxies for accuracy of data
and economic indicators is observed when we apply the Newcomb-Benford law to second
digits.
One concern of our study is that the proxies for data accuracy are calculated based on
limited sample sizes for individual countries. To resolve this potential problem, we confirm
our findings for the sub-sample of 50 countries that provide regional data (at a state or
province level). Regional data increases the sample size from which we calculate our statistics
substantially and increases the precision of our accuracy measures.
We also find similar relationship for the previous swine flu (H1N1) pandemic of 2009-2010.
For 35 countries that reported weekly data of the number of confirmed cases and the number
of deaths to Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), we repeat our analyses. We find
support for the negative relationship between deviations from the NBL and development
indicators.
There is substantial body of literature trying to assess the tendency of misreporting data
by countries using different statistical techniques, such as case fatality rates, excess mortal-
ity rates, the variance of reported data, and even trends in search engines (See Polson (2020),
Aron and Muellbauer (2020), Goutte and Damette (2020) The Economist (2020), and Dragan (2020),
among others). The inherent problem with these studies is that they rely on uniform ap-
proaches to measuring confirmed cases and COVID-19-related deaths across countries and
across periods within a country. Even though countries are expected to follow the same
guidelines by the World Health Organization (WHO) when reporting cases, many varia-
tions exist between countries (and sometimes states and regions within a country) in how
they collect and report data. Any comparisons of raw numbers, like the total number of
confirmed cases, the number of deaths, and mortality rates, among countries may be also
problematic because they are most likely driven by the difference in other variables, like the
number of tests conducted, the strength of the healthcare system, demographic composition,
and reporting standards. Correct testing would require controlling for all those hard-to-
observe variables. This makes comparisons between countries difficult. A nice property
of the Newcomb-Benford law is that the data generating process may be different between
observations (in our case, countries). As long as data are expected to obey the NBL, cross-
observation comparisons are possible. This means that we can apply the test even if countries
are different in how they measure COVID-19 cases and related deaths. The test is also free of
country-specific differences, including public policies used to stop the pandemic, like quaran-
tines, social distancing, testing, and availability of treatment. On the other hand, the NBL
test is sensitive to human intervention and manipulation of data in the otherwise naturally
occurring processes.
We are not the only paper that tries to use the Newcomb-Benford law to test validity of re-
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ported data during COVID-19. Several other concurrent studies (Jackson and Sambridge (2020);
Idrovo and Manrique-Hernandez (2020); Koch and Okamura (2020); Peng and Nagata (2020);
Zhang (2020)) use a similar approach. However, these papers usually select one or few coun-
tries and apply the NBL to test if there is any evidence of manipulation in a given country’s
data. The papers use the cutoff values from the chi-squared distribution (or similar distri-
butions) and give a ’yes or no’ type of answer to their binary research question. In many
cases, the goodness-of-fit measures are calculated with substantial errors, and many studies
do not provide estimates for the statistical significance of their test and its power. This
leads to contradicting findings among these studies when looking at the same country. Any
inferences from such tests are also problematic. Our approach is different. First, we use all
countries that were affected by COVID-19 and calculate accuracy (goodness-of-fit) measures
and economic indicators for each of them. It is true that each goodness-of-fit measures are
calculated with some error. However, in our paper, we study the link between the compliance
with the Newcomb-Benford law and economic indicators. Each data point in our analysis is a
country. It is the relationship between the proxies for data manipulation and the democratic
and economic development of a country that we find significant in most tests.
We stress that our paper is not aimed to answer questions whether particular countries
manipulate data. After aggregating data from many countries, we conclude that there is a
correlation between the tendency to manipulate data during pandemics (as measured by the
NBL) and macroeconomic indicators.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 talks about the Newcomb-Benford law of
anomalous numbers, Section 3 describes our sample and variables, Section 4 provides major
results for the study, including robustness checks, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Newcomb-Benford law of anomalous numbers
In many naturally occurring processes, the resulting data have the leading significant digit
that is not uniformly distributed. The distribution is monotonically decreasing, with one
being the most common first digit, and nine being the least common. The law was formally
stated by Newcomb (1881) and Benford (1938). A set of numbers is said to follow the NBL
if the first digit d occurs with probability P (d) = log10(1 +
1
d
).2 This gives the following
probabilities for observing the first and second digits:
Digit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
First - 30.1% 17.6% 12.5% 9.7% 7.9% 6.7% 5.8% 5.1% 4.6%
Second 12.0% 11.4% 10.9% 10.4% 10.0% 9.7% 9.3% 9.0% 8.8% 8.5%
The data are expected to follow NBL when the logarithms of values are uniformly and
randomly distributed. The Newcomb-Benford law describes well many real-life sets of nu-
2The law can be extended to digits beyond the first. In general, for the nth digit, n ≥ 2, the probability
is given by P (d) =
∑10n−1−1
k=10n−2 log10(1 +
1
10k+d
).
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merical data, including lengths of rivers, stock prices, street addresses, accounting data,
populations, physical constants, and regression coefficients (Diekmann (2007)). Data gen-
erated from many distributions and integer sequences have been shown to closely obey the
NBL. These data include Fibonacci numbers, powers of numbers, exponential growth, many
ratio distributions, and the F -distribution with low degrees of freedom.3
Not all distributions generate data that follow the law. For example, the uniform distri-
bution, the normal distribution, and square roots of numbers do not obey it. For the data to
obey the Newcomb-Benford law, several criteria should be satisfied (Durtschi et al. (2004);
Diekmann (2007); Tam Cho and Gaines (2007)):
• the data span several orders of magnitudes and are relatively uniform over these orders
of magnitude
• the mean is greater than the median, with a positive skewness
• naturally occurring processes, the data which are the result of multiplicative fluctua-
tions, and the data that is not influenced by human intervention.
The last requirement, i.e. the fact that human interventions usually generate data that
violates the Newcomb-Benford law, made it a useful tool in detecting fraud and data manip-
ulation. Studies have shown that when humans intervene with the data generating process
that is expected to comply with the NBL, the compliance stops.
For example, Diekmann (2007) and Horton et al. (2018) show that when scientific data
are fabricated, they do not conform with the Newcomb-Benford law. Cantu and Saigh (2010)
and Breunig and Goerres (2011) show the same effect for electoral data. Using elections in
the province of Buenos Aires (Argentina) between 1932 and 1942, Cantu and Saigh (2010)
find that the Newcomb-Benford law is an effective tool for identifying fraud. To search
for electoral irregularities, Breunig and Goerres (2011) apply the Newcomb-Benford law to
electoral data in Germany. In the same spirit, Kaiser (2019) shows that discrepancies from
the target Newcomb-Benford law distribution can be used to test reliability of survey data
sets.
The NBL has been extensively used to detect fraud in accounting and finance. Horton et al. (2018)
investigate whether the Newcomb-Benford law could be applied to data used within pub-
lished accounting studies. They test whether retracted papers differ significantly from a
control group of non-retracted articles by competing authors. Their results indicate that
retracted papers significantly deviate from the Newcomb-Benford law relative to the control
group of papers. Nigrini (2012) and Stambaugh et al. (2012) show that fraudulent trading
records and fabricated returns do not comply with the the Newcomb-Benford law, whereas
naturally occurring data do.
The Newcomb-Benford law also has been widely applied to detecting fraud in macroeco-
nomic data. Rauch et al. (2013) apply the Newcomb-Benford law to the London Inter-bank
Offered Rate (LIBOR) rates and successfully detect manipulated data. O’Keefe and Yom (2017)
study the determinants of fraudulent behavior among failed banks between 1989 and 2015.
They use the second-digit NBL to identify those banks whose financial statements suggest
tampering and purposeful misstatements. Their results suggest that insider abuse and fraud
3For more examples, see Hill (1995); Hill (1998); Leemis et al. (2000); Formann (2010); Morrow (2010).
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at banks are detectable by using the NBL analysis of bank financial data. Hussain (2020)
detects any possible data errors, irregularities, or fraud by applying the NBL to the credit
bureau data of commercial banks. By analyzing five European Equity Market indices,
Kalaichelvan and Shawn (2012) find evidence that substantiates the criticism for the use
of the uniformity assumption for tests at the 1000 level in favor of a distribution consistent
with the Newcomb-Benford law.
Overall, Benford law has been used to detect fraud in:
• scientific studies (Geyer and Williamson (2004); Diekmann (2007); Judge and Schechter (2009);
Horton et al. (2018)),
• accounting (Varian (1972); Durtschi et al. (2004); Suh et al. (2011); Nigrini (2012);
Stambaugh et al. (2012); Horton et al. (2018)),
• election data (Mebane (2006); Tam Cho and Gaines (2007); Cantu and Saigh (2010);
Breunig and Goerres (2011); Deckert et al. (2017)),
• macroeconomic data (Nye and Moul (2007); Gonzalez-Garcia and Pastor (2009); Rauch et al. (2011);
Kalaichelvan and Shawn (2012); Rauch et al. (2013); Michalski and Stoltz (2013); O’Keefe and Yom (2017);
Hussain (2020)),
• forensic analysis (Pinilla et al. (2018)),
• tax evasion (Nigrini (1996); Demir and Javorcik (2018)),
• toxics release inventory (Marchi and Hamilton (2006)),
• reported data during pandemics (Idrovo et al. (2011); Gomez-Campnovo et al. (2016);
Idrovo and Manrique-Hernandez (2020)).
Another useful property of the data that obey the Newcomb-Benford law is that it is scale
invariant, i.e. it is independent of the measurement units. This makes it a powerful tool
when testing data from different sources (i.e., countries, companies): the actual method that
generates the data becomes irrelevant as long as the data is expected to obey the NBL. In
our application, it means that countries may differ in the way they count COVID-19 cases
or deaths, but as long as the data for each country is expected to obey the NBL, we can test
the data for the goodness-of-fit to the NBL.
3 Data and variables
3.1 Sample and economic indicators
We start by collecting daily data for the cumulative number of confirmed cases and the
cumulative number of deaths from John Hopkins University4 between January 22, 2020 and
June 10, 2020. For economic indicators, we pick the following four proxies for democratic
4https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html. Downloadable database is available at
https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19.
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and economic development widely used in the literature: the Economist Intelligence Unit
Democracy Index, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, Healthcare Expenditures
as percentage of GDP, and the Universal Health Coverage Index.
The Democracy Index (EIU) is a weighted-average of answers to 60 questions from
experts’ assessments grouped into five categories: electoral pluralism, functioning of the
government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. The index is aimed
to measure the degree of democracy of a country. In addition to the Democracy Index, we
use the GDP per capita as a proxy for the country’s economic wealth. We also use the
country’s healthcare spending as percentage of GDP and Universal Health Coverage Index
as proxies for the strength of the country’s healthcare system.
We download countries’ democracy indices (EIU) from The Economist Intelligence Unit
for 2019.5 We collect the Gross Domestic Product (GDP ) per capita, Health Expenditures
as percentage of GDP (HE GDP ), and Universal Health Coverage Index (UHC) for 2017
from the World Bank.6 We get population data for each country from Worldometer.7 A
total of 185 countries with data were affected by COVID-19. The summary for each country
can be found in Appendix A1. Variable definitions can be found in Appendix A2.
Studies have shown that naturally occurring processes comply well with the Newcomb-
Benford law when the data grow exponentially or close to it (Leemis et al. (2000); Formann (2010)).
Once the data reach the plateau, the data are not expected to obey the NBL. Hence, for the
data to be expected to comply with the NBL, we first need to identify the growth part. To do
that, we use the following approach. Because data show weekly seasonality, we first compute
seven-day moving averages (MA) for the daily new number of confirmed cases. For each
country then, we identify the date with the highest MA number of the new daily confirmed
cases. If there are several dates with the same maximum, we use the earliest of them as the
cutoff. For our main analyses, we use data before the obtained cutoff for each country.8
3.2 Goodness-of-fit measures
To measure how well the data comply with the Newcomb-Benford law, we use several
goodness-of-fit measure. The most intuitive and commonly used is the chi-squared statistic:
Chi-sq. =
9∑
d=1
(Od −Ed)2
Ed
, (1)
where Od and Ed are observed and expected by the NBL frequencies for digit d, respectively.
Chi-squared, however, has several problems. It has low statistical power when used with
small sample sizes and enormous power with large sample sizes. Therefore, we use alternative
5https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index.
6https://data.worldbank.org/. Downloadable database is available from
https://databank.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/1ff4a498/Popular-Indicators. At
the time we collected the data, many countries still did not have the World Bank data available for 2018 or
2019. 2017 is the latest year for which the data are available for all countries.
7https://www.worldometers.info/.
8In unreported tests, we also try modified approaches. We find the maximum ratio MA(number of new
daily cases)/(Days since the first case for the country) and MA(number of new daily cases)/(Days since the
latest nonzero case for the country). The results are robust to alternative definitions of the cutoff date.
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measures of goodness-of-fit proposed in extant studies. We use a modified version of the
Kuiper (1962) test proposed by Stephens (1970) and Giles (2007) that is independent of the
sample size N :
Kuiper = (D+N +D
−
N)
[√
N + 0.155 +
0.24√
N
]
, and (2)
D+N = sup
−∞<x<+∞
|FN(x)− F0(x)| and D−N = sup
−∞<x<+∞
|F0(x)− FN (x)|, (3)
where FN (x) and F0(x) are the observed cumulative distribution function (cdf) of leading
digits and the cdf of the data that comply with the NBL. In addition, we calculate the
M -statistic proposed by Leemis et al. (2000):
M =
9
max
d=1
|od − ed|
√
N (4)
and the D-statistic proposed by Tam Cho and Gaines (2007):
D =
√√√√N 9∑
d=1
(od − ed)2 (5)
where od and ed are the proportions of observations having d as the first digit and expected
by the NBL, respectively. The latter two measures are also insensitive to sample size. We
calculate each goodness-of-fit measure for two variables, the cumulative number of confirmed
cases and the cumulative number of deaths.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the major variables in our analyses. The
goodness-of-fit measures show that the average country’s data is about borderline in terms
of compliance to the Newcomb-Benford law: it is consistent with the NBL if 1% level of sig-
nificance is used, but is not consistent if 10% is used. This is true for both, confirmed cases
and deaths. Observe that the corresponding mean and median goodness-of-fit measures are
higher for the number of deaths than for the number of confirmed cases. In a univariate
setting, this indicates that countries are more prone to manipulate death data.
The average country in our sample has over 42 million people, slightly less than $6,000
of GDP per capita,9 with roughly 6% of the GDP being spent of health expenditures, with
the democracy index of around 55 on the scale between zero and 100, and with around 65%
of the population being covered by the universal health care (Table 1). The average sample
size per country is slightly over 61 days for the number of confirmed cases and is around 40
for the number of deaths.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
Table 2 provides Pearson correlation coefficients between major variables. The four
major economic indicators, especially EIU , ln(GDP ), and UHC, are highly correlated, with
correlation coefficients ranging between 0.59 and 0.85 (all values are statistically significant).
HE GDP is also correlated with the other indicators, with correlation coefficients ranging
between 0.37 and 0.46 (also significant). These variables are most likely proxies for the same
9Note that we use the natural logarithm of the population and GDP values.
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indicator, the development of a country, therefore, to avoid multicollinearity, we include
only one indicator at a time in our analysis.10 The four goodness-of-fit measures are also
highly correlated with each other. The total number of confirmed cases and the country’s
population are also very correlated. Univariate results in Table 2 also show that all goodness-
of-fit measures are negatively correlated with the four economic indicators, with 22 out of
32 correlation coefficients being significant (all correlation coefficients for the cumulative
number of deaths are significant).
[Insert Table 2 around here]
4 Results
4.1 Goodness-of-fit and economic indicators
We start with the simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model where our goodness-
of-fit measures are on the left-hand-side and economic indicators are on the right-hand-side:
Goodness-of -fiti = β0 + β1Indicatori + β2 ln(Population)i +
+β3Number of Daysi + εi, (6)
where Indicatori denotes one of the four economic indicators: EIU , ln(GDP ), HE DP ,
or UHC. Higher values of the goodness-of-fit measures indicate more deviation from the
Newcomb-Benford law. If more developed countries are less likely to manipulate data, we
expect the coefficient β1 to be negative.
How well the data for each country is expected to obey the NBL depends on the span of
the data. Countries with higher populations and more confirmed cases or deaths are expected
to follow the NBL more closely. To control for that, we include the natural logarithm of
the country’s total population. Alternatively, we include the very correlated number of
confirmed cases (or deaths). We find that the results are qualitatively and quantitatively
the same when we used alternative control variables (untabulated).
Even though the Kupier, M, and D-statistics are calculated to be more independent
of the sample size, goodness-of-fit measures may still be affected by the sample sizes we
use to estimate them for each country. To control for the sample size effect, we include
Number of Daysi, which is the number of days with nonzero confirmed cases (or the number
of days with nonzero deaths) between January 22, 2020 and the cutoff date for the growth
part.
The results of estimating Equation 6 are presented in Table 3. Panel A provides esti-
mates for the cumulative number of confirmed cases. All but one coefficients in front of
economic indicators are negative. Coefficients for ln(GDP ) and UHC are always significant.
The coefficient for EIU is significant only when the chi-squared goodness-of-fit measure is
used and the coefficient for HE GDP lacks significance in all tests. Panel B provides es-
timates for the cumulative number of deaths. Again, all coefficients are negative and are
10In unreported tests we try to put all economic indicators together in one equation on the right-hand-side
and test for collinearity. The result shows the Condition Number is over 46, indicative of serious collinearity.
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all significant. The magnitude of coefficients for the number of deaths is also much higher
than that for the number of confirmed cases.11 We interpret the data as being consistent
with more developed countries being less likely to deviate from the Newcomb-Benford law
when reporting pandemic data. Specifically, countries with higher GDP per capita and uni-
versal health coverage are less likely to manipulate their data during COVID-19. We find
weaker evidence for the democracy index EIU and health expenditures as percentage of
GDP (HE GDP ). The relationship is more pronounced for the total number of deaths than
for the number of confirmed cases, and holds for all economic indicators. As predicted, the
control variable ln(Population)i is negative and significant in all regressions: countries with
higher populations (and total number of cases) deviate less from the NBL.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
The results are also economically significant: an increase of one standard deviation in
the economic indicators, on average, results in an increase of 0.25 of the standard deviation
in the goodness-of-fit measures. This value is roughly the same for the number of confirmed
cases and the number of deaths, across all economic indicators.
Instead of looking at the linear relationship between the goodness-of-fit measures, one
could look at the probability of a country to deviate from the NBL. To do that, we first
identify the critical values (at the 1% significance level) for each goodness–of-fit measure
and create a set of four dummy variables, Chi-sq., Kuiper, M , and D, where each dummy
variable equals one if the corresponding goodness-of-fit measure is above the critical value
(i.e. we reject the null hypothesis that the data obeys the NBL), and zero otherwise. We
then estimate Equation 6 using the logit model. The results are presented in Table 4. Panel
A provides estimates for the total number of cases. Again, most coefficients for the economic
indicators are negative and all coefficients for ln(GDP ) and UHC are significant. Panel B
shows the results for the death toll. All coefficients for all economic indicators are negative
and significant. We again conclude that more developed countries and countries with better
health systems follow the Newcomb-Benford law more closely, and the relationship is more
pronounced for the number of deaths than for the number of confirmed cases.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
4.2 Robustness
One limitation of our analysis above is that it depends on the cutoff date for the growth part
of the data. The cutoff value is estimated using the data, validity of which we are trying
to assess. This creates a possible endogeneity problem. To resolve the issue, we try several
different approaches. Instead of using a specific for each country cutoff value, we use the
same, “global,” cutoff value for all countries, which is 80 days since January 22, 2020 (or
April 11, 2020). We pick 80 days because it corresponds to the second tercile of cutoff dates
in our sample. Anything much sooner will result in too small sample sizes for many countries,
especially for the ones that were affected by the pandemic later than others. Anything much
later, and too many countries will have already reached their plateaus, and are not expected
11In unreported tests we find that the coefficients for corresponding economic indicators are statistically
different from each other between Panels A and B in each case in Table 3.
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to obey the Newcomb-Benford law anymore. We then calculate our four goodness-of-fit
measures using the global cutoff value and re-estimate Equation 6. The results are reported
in Table 5. Panel A has the data for the confirmed cases. All coefficients for all four economic
indicators are negative and significant in all regressions. Panel B has the data for the death
count. Again, all coefficients in all regression are negative and significant, confirming our
earlier findings.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
Alternatively, we try the same cutoff number of days since the first case for each country.
Again, we pick the second tercile, which is 45 days since the first case for the country. We re-
estimate Equation 6 for the new measures of the goodness-of-fit. The results are presented in
Table 6, which are largely consistent with our previous findings.12 We also try the following
“window” approach: instead of using one cutoff date, we estimate a series of goodness-of-fit
measures over a range of dates.13 We then find the average over those values, and re-run
regression 6. Again, the results are unchanged (untabulated). We conclude that our results
are not driven by the specific pick of the cutoff dates for the growth part of the data.
[Insert Table 6 around here]
Another concern is that our data is driven by countries with few cases or few data points.
To test for that, we exclude countries with lower than 200 (500 and 1,000) total number of
confirmed cases. We then exclude countries with fewer than 30 (40) days of nonzero cases.
We also tried excluding countries with the highest 1% (5%) goodness-of-fit measures. In
reported tests we find that the results are robust in all cases. We conclude that our results
are not driven by small countries, countries with a small number of cases, or by extreme
deviations from the NBL.
4.3 Regional Data
Testing for compliance with the Newcomb-Benford law requires sufficient data. For many
countries in our analysis above, the goodness-of-fit measures are calculated based on rel-
atively small samples sizes of between 40 and 140 days. Even though we control for the
sample size and conduct robustness checks, making inferences from results based on such
small sample sizes might be problematic. The sample size may be increased significantly for
a country, if beyond data at a country level it reports data at a regional (state, territory,
or provinces) level. Each reported value at a regional level can then be used to estimate
goodness-of-fit measures, instead of using the country-level data. The method has the up-
side that the goodness-of-fit measures are estimated with a greater precision, the downside
being a much smaller number of countries that collect regional data.
12Observe that we still include the Number of Daysi control variable. This variable in general is different
from the number of days between the first case for the country and the cutoff value because it counts only
the days with nonzero number of cases (or deaths). For many countries, especially during the first weeks of
the pandemic, there were days with zero confirmed cases (or deaths) after the first case.
13Specifically, we try ±1, ±3, ±5 days around the original cutoff date.
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50 out of 185 countries in our sample collect data at a regional level.14 For these countries,
we re-estimate the goodness-of-fit measures and re-run Equation 6. The results are reported
in Table 7.15 Panel A is for the confirmed number of cases, Panel B is for the number of
deaths. For the cumulative number of cases, 12 out of 16 coefficients are negative, with
eight being significant. For the cumulative number of deaths, all coefficients are negative
and significant. The results are consistent with our earlier finding: countries with higher
democracy indices, GPD per capita, health expenditures, and universal healthcare coverage
are less likely to manipulate pandemic data, especially the number of deaths.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
4.4 Second digit tests
The Newcomb-Benford law can be extended to digits beyond the first (O’Keefe and Yom (2017)
and Hussain (2020)). Beyond the second digit, the theoretical distribution quickly converges
to uniform. Here, we repeat our tests but use the second digit goodness-of-fit measures
instead of the leading digit. The results are presented in Table 8, again, with two panels:
one for the confirmed number of cases, and one for the number of deaths. In Panel A, all
coefficients are negative and nine out of 16 coefficients are significant. In Panel B, all coef-
ficients are negative, and, except for two coefficients for UHC, are significant. We conclude
that second digits accord with our main findings.
[Insert Table 8 around here]
4.5 Swine flu pandemic of 2009-2010
A natural extension to our study is to see if the negative relationship between goodness-
of-fit measures and economic indicators holds for other pandemics. A unit of observation
in our study is a country. Pandemics that engulf many countries and for which data are
available are rare in modern history. The natural candidate is the recent swine flu (H1N1)
pandemic of 2009-2010. Swine flu (H1N1) 2009-2010 was a pandemic that lasted over 19
months between January of 2009 and August 2010. The pandemic affected 58 countries,
with tens of thousands (in some estimates, millions and even hundreds of millions) of people
infected and tens of thousands (in some estimates, hundreds of thousands) of deaths.
Even though the pandemic happened during the modern history and after the advent
of the Internet, surveillance data availability and reporting was much more limited in 2009
than during COVID-19. Many countries did not collect daily or even weekly data, reporting
was limited, and so is public availability of data. As a result, there is only a very small
number of studies that directly test accuracy and/or manipulation of data during the swine
flu (H1N1) 2009-2010 pandemic (a notable exception is the study by Idrovo et al. (2011)).
The WHO, PAHO, and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provide many
14For the list of countries, see Appendix A1. Regional data are from the COVID-19 Coronavirus Map.
https://covid19.health/. Downloadable data set is at https://github.com/stevenliuyi/covid19. We check for
data consistency between the two data sources and find the high degree of agreement.
15Note the slightly smaller number of observations. For the second-digit test to work, the data should be
at least over ten.
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estimates for the total number of cases and deaths, but these cannot be used with the
Newcomb-Benford test because the test gauges human intervention in actual reported data.
To apply the NBL test, we collect data for 35 countries in the Americas that reported
weekly the number of confirmed cases and deaths to the Pan American Health Organization
(PAHO). We obtain the data for the weekly number of confirmed cases and the distribution
of first digits from Idrovo et al. (2011). The data for the weekly number of deaths is down-
loaded from the PAHO web site.16 We then repeat the analyses and re-estimate regression
6 for swine flu (H1N1) 2009-2010 data. Instead of using the latest economic indicators, we
use 2009 values. The results are reported in Table 9. Panel A reports results for the number
of confirmed cases. 12 out of 16 coefficients in front of macroeconomic indicators are nega-
tive. It should be noted that the sample size for this test is extremly small, with at most
35 countries. Obtaining significant results with such small sample sizes is hard. Yet, we
were able to obtain significant coefficients for five coefficients, and two more just barely lack
significance. Panel B reports results for the number of deaths. The sample size for Panel B
is even smaller. 14 out of 16 coefficients are negative, and seven are significant. We conclude
that the swine flu (H1N1) 2009-2010 results are largely consistent with our findings for the
COVID-19 pandemic.
[Insert Table 9 around here]
5 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the accuracy of reported data and
macroeconomic indicators for a set of 185 countries affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
We use the deviation from the Newcomb-Benford law of anomalous numbers as a proxy for
data manipulation. We find the negative relationship between the four NBL goodness-of-fit
measures and the four economic indicators, which indicates that countries that are more
democratic, more developed and that have stronger healthcare systems are less likely to
manipulate data during pandemics. We also find that the relationship is stronger the number
of deaths than for the number of confirmed cases. The results are robust to alternative testing
periods, are not driven by small countries or countries with a small number of cases, or
extreme deviations from the NBL. We also show that the relationship holds for 50 countries
that report regional data, for second digit tests, and for the previous swine flu (H1N1)
pandemic.
Overall, we conclude that democratic regimes and more economically developed coun-
tries, and countries with stronger healthcare systems provide more accurate data during
pandemics. Authoritarian regimes and poorer countries, on the other hand, are more likely
to manipulate data, specifically, the death toll.
The interpretations of our findings are based on the promise that deviations from the
Newcomb-Benford law are indicative of data manipulation. Many studies indeed show in
macroeconomic, accounting, finance, and forensic analysis, human intervention and data
manipulation creates data sets that violate the Newcomb-Benford law. Many naturally
occurring processes, on the other hand, generate data that obey the law. This makes the
16The data is available at https://www.paho.org/hq/images/atlas/en/atlas.html?detectflash=false.
13
NBL an easy tool to test for data manipulation. Several limitation of our study should
be mentioned. Although we use compliance of data with the Newcomb-Benford law as a
proxy for accuracy, alternative interpretations of our findings are possible. The test works
only if the data are expected to obey the NBL. We use careful techniques to separate the
“growth” part of the data and several indicators show us that the pandemic data are a good
candidate to test with the NBL. However, if the pandemic data is not supposed to follow
the Newcomb-Benford law, then the observed relationship can be explained by the expected
deviation from the law based on other factors, like the sample size and the span of the data.
We try to control for these effects to our best.
We should also note that the aim of this paper is not to provide evidence whether a
particular country manipulates data. Such claims require precise estimation of the goodness-
of-fit measure and a strong evidence that the country’s expected distribution is indeed the
NBL. Given the small sample sizes in terms of the number of days since the beginning of the
pandemic and before a country reaches a plateau (when the NBL is not applicable anymore)
and given the nonavailability of regional data for most countries, the goodness-of-fit measures
are estimated with error. Therefore, conclusions for individual countries are difficult to state.
In contrast, this study documents a general relationship between macroeconomic indicators
of countries and their tendency to report inaccurate data.
Further research is needed that would combine different methods that test for data ma-
nipulation and include the Newcomb-Benford law, biostatistics, moments of distributions,
excess mortality rates, and social media data. Even more important is research related to
methods that can prevent data manipulation and fraud during pandemics.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Obs Mean Std. Min Med Max
Chi-sq. Conf. 185 19.55 20.22 1.40 13.60 129.38
Kuiper Conf. 185 1.48 0.73 0.39 1.37 4.70
M Conf. 185 1.08 0.69 0.29 0.90 4.54
D Conf. 185 1.44 0.74 0.42 1.31 5.04
Chi-sq. Death 160 29.35 37.35 1.71 17.22 261.49
Kuiper Death 160 1.75 1.07 0.32 1.54 5.81
M Death 160 1.32 0.99 0.19 1.00 5.68
D Death 160 1.72 1.07 0.39 1.46 6.10
EIU 163 54.84 21.98 13.20 56.50 98.70
ln(GDP) 178 8.68 1.45 5.68 8.65 12.03
HE GDP 174 6.44 2.57 1.18 6.23 17.06
UHC 175 64.44 15.68 25.00 69.00 89.00
No. of Days Conf. 185 61.24 30.61 1.00 61.00 136.00
No. of Days Death 185 39.59 29.74 0.00 36.00 124.00
ln(Population) 182 15.84 2.02 10.43 16.08 21.09
This table presents the summary statistics of major variables including the goodness-of-fit measures
(Chi-square, Kuiper, M and D) for confirmed cases and death cases, economic indicator (EIU, ln(GDP),
HE GDP, UHC), and other variables. The number of observations vary due to the missing value. The
original dataset is included in Appendix A1, adn variable definition is included in Appendix A2.
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix
Variables
Chi-sq. Conf. (1)
Kuiper Conf. (2)
M Conf. (3)
D Conf. (4)
Chi-sq. Death (5)
Kuiper Death (6)
M Death (7)
D Death (8)
EIU (9)
ln(GDP) (10)
HE GDP (11)
UHC (12)
ln(Population) (13)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
0.89*** 0.81*** 0.91*** 0.48*** 0.53*** 0.56*** 0.54*** -0.03 -0.21** -0.13 -0.19** -0.12
0.88*** 0.95*** 0.46*** 0.47*** 0.47* 0.48*** -0.01 -0.21** -0.09 -0.16* -0.10
0.96*** 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.05 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05
0.49*** 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.00 -0.18** -0.08 -0.15* -0.08
0.86*** 0.81*** 0.86*** -0.18** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.16*
0.94*** 0.97*** -0.23*** -0.35*** -0.30*** -0.34*** -0.23***
0.98*** -0.20** -0.30*** -0.25*** -0.32*** -0.28***
-0.25*** -0.36*** -0.31*** -0.37*** -0.26***
0.64*** 0.46*** 0.59*** -0.11
0.37*** 0.85*** -0.15*
0.45*** -0.04
-0.07
This table shows the correlation matrix with pearson correlation values of the goodness-of-fit measures and economic indicators. *, **, ***
denote the significance at level 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.
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Table 3: Main Results I
1
Variable
EIU
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
ln(GDP)
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
HE GDP
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
UHC
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
Panel A. Confirmed Cases
Chi-squared Kuiper M D
−9.54* −0.19 −0.02 −0.15
(0.08) (0.22) (0.46) (0.27)
−3.41*** −0.12*** −0.08** −0.11***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
20.78*** 0.93*** 0.75*** 0.87***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
162 162 162 162
10.05% 11.57% 7.12% 9.39%
−3.41*** −0.13*** −0.07** −0.12***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
−3.93*** −0.15*** −0.11*** −0.14***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
23.13*** 0.99*** 0.83*** 0.95***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
176 176 176 176
16.06% 20.39% 11.98% 17.05%
−0.53 −0.01 0.00 −0.01*
(0.17) (0.38) (0.45) (0.34)
−3.16*** −0.13*** −0.10*** −0.12***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
21.40*** 0.99*** 0.81*** 0.92***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
173 173 173 173
10.94% 13.67% 9.17% 11.15%
−24.33*** −0.81*** −0.46* −0.81***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01)
−3.97*** −0.14*** −0.10*** −0.13***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
22.75*** 0.98*** 0.81*** 0.93***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
174 174 174 174
14.01% 16.57% 10.27% 14.29%
Panel B. Death Cases
Chi-squared Kuiper M D
−33.61*** −1.25*** −1.09*** −1.36***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−6.39*** −0.24*** −0.24*** −0.26***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
37.45*** 1.11*** 0.69** 0.96***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
148 148 148 148
11.63% 18.08% 15.43% 19.00%
−6.53*** −0.25*** −0.22*** −0.27***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−5.71*** −0.22*** −0.19*** −0.21***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
36.00*** 1.07*** 0.66** 0.92***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
155 155 155 155
13.89% 22.99% 16.97% 22.21%
−3.21*** −0.11*** −0.09*** −0.11***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−4.47*** −0.17*** −0.15*** −0.17***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
31.12*** 1.00*** 0.61** 0.83***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
151 151 151 151
11.24% 16.50% 11.56% 15.33%
−59.61*** −2.09*** −1.87*** −2.33***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−5.49*** −0.21*** −0.19*** −0.21***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
38.18*** 1.19*** 0.77*** 1.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
155 155 155 155
13.73% 20.66% 16.63% 21.52%
This table presents the main results using COVID-19 pandemic data. We estimate equation 6 using first-digit goodness-of-fit measures. Panel A shows
the results of confirmed cases while panel B includes the results of death cases. To avoid small coefficients, we divide EIU, UHC, and No. of Days values
by 100 for all models. Sample sizes vary due to missing values. All models are estimated using OLS regression. P-values for an one-tailed t-test are in
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variable definitions are in Appendix A2.
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Table 4: Main Results II
1
Variable
EIU
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Pseudo R2
ln(GDP)
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Pseudo R2
HE GDP
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Pseudo R2
UHC
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Pseudo R2
Panel A. Confirmed Cases
Chi-squared Kuiper M D
−0.94 −0.09 −0.08 −0.26*
(0.13) (0.46) (0.46) (0.37)
−0.36*** −0.47*** −0.12 −0.30***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.01)
1.77*** 2.92*** 1.87*** 1.90***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
162 162 162 162
6.13% 10.55% 4.04% 5.15%
−0.46*** −0.39*** −0.27** −0.42***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
−0.39*** −0.54*** −0.24** −0.37***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
2.08*** 3.39*** 2.04*** 2.17***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
176 176 176 176
11.00% 14.93% 6.69% 10.48%
−0.03 −0.01 0.01 0.03*
(0.35) (0.47) (0.43) (0.32)
−0.26*** −0.40*** −0.20** −0.30***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
1.78*** 2.98*** 1.96*** 2.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
173 173 173 173
4.67% 10.25% 4.32% 5.55%
−2.73*** −2.38** −2.00** −2.50**
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01)
−0.41*** −0.55*** −0.20** −0.33***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
1.98*** 3.16*** 2.05*** 2.15***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
174 174 174 174
9.11% 13.74% 6.22% 8.13%
Panel B. Death Cases
Chi-squared Kuiper M D
−2.81*** −2.39*** −2.22*** −2.67***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
−0.58*** −0.45*** −0.46*** −0.52***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
3.22*** 2.24*** 1.62** 1.96***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
148 148 148 148
18.81% 12.05% 10.71% 13.88%
−0.66*** −0.50*** −0.43*** −0.52***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−0.65*** −0.49*** −0.43*** −0.48***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
3.63*** 2.53*** 1.81*** 2.16***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
155 155 155 155
24.24% 14.85% 11.61% 15.29%
−0.31*** −0.20** −0.20*** −0.29***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
−0.49*** −0.34*** −0.33*** −0.35***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2.86*** 2.10*** 1.36** 1.63**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
151 151 151 151
19.92% 10.82% 9.25% 13.13%
−6.17*** −3.91*** −4.06*** −5.63***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−0.63*** −0.43*** −0.41*** −0.47***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
3.82*** 2.56*** 1.89*** 2.29***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
155 155 155 155
25.45% 13.10% 12.22% 18.47%
This table presents the main results using COVID-19 pandemic data. Instead of using the goodness of fit measures, we define a binary variable as dependent
variable indicating whether data violate first-digit NBL, which equals to 1 when the goodness-of-fit > 1% threshold, and 0 otherwise. The 1% threshold
for all 4 measures are: 20.09 for Chi-squared, 2.00 for Kuiper, 1.21 for M, and 1.57 for D. Panel A shows the results of confirmed cases while panel B
includes the results of death cases. To avoid small coefficients, we divide EIU, UHC, and No. of Days values by 100 for all models. Sample sizes vary due
to missing values. All models are estimated using binary logistic regression with McFadden Pseudo R2 as the goodness of fit for each model. P-values for
an one-tailed t-test are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variable definitions are in Appendix
A2.
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Table 5: Robustness Results I
1
Variable
EIU
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
ln(GDP)
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
HE GDP
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
UHC
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
Panel A. Confirmed Cases
Chi-squared Kuiper M D
−42.42*** −0.93*** −0.83*** −0.98***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1.98 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02*
(0.17) (0.34) (0.44) (0.35)
67.53*** 1.77*** 1.80*** 1.91***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
159 159 159 159
12.56% 11.85% 13.14% 13.73%
−8.73*** −0.32*** −0.31*** −0.35***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−2.22 −0.17*** −0.16*** −0.18***
(0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
94.43*** 3.13*** 3.17*** 3.40***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
173 173 173 173
11.01% 21.77% 22.67% 25.44%
−2.75*** −0.08*** −0.07*** −0.08***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1.11 −0.05* −0.04 −0.04*
(0.23) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10)
54.66*** 1.59*** 1.71*** 1.73***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
170 170 170 170
8.17% 10.34% 11.68% 11.43%
−51.09** −1.95*** −2.05*** −2.26***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−0.23 −0.11*** −0.10*** −0.12***
(0.45) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
75.17*** 2.51*** 2.64*** 2.80***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
171 171 171 171
7.84% 13.74% 16.36% 17.47%
Panel B. Death Cases
Chi-squared Kuiper M D
−34.03*** −1.63*** −1.40*** −1.54***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−2.94*** −0.15*** −0.14*** −0.15***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
44.71*** 1.16** 1.22** 1.45***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
135 135 135 135
15.42% 17.42% 12.54% 15.49%
−5.08*** −0.29*** −0.25*** −0.28***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−3.22*** −0.20*** −0.16*** −0.18***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
56.23*** 2.00*** 1.82*** 2.20***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
142 142 142 142
13.60% 20.94% 14.45% 18.09%
−2.75*** −0.12*** −0.12*** −0.13***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−1.57** −0.10*** −0.09*** −0.10***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
43.66*** 1.11** 1.27** 1.46***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
138 138 138 138
17.74% 17.37% 16.40% 17.75%
−48.90*** −2.60*** −2.40*** −2.59***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−2.85*** −0.16*** −0.15*** −0.16***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
54.81*** 1.78*** 1.87*** 2.15***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
140 140 140 140
13.24% 18.28% 15.02% 17.76%
This table presents the first robustness results using global cutoff value which is April 11, 2020. Panel A shows the results of confirmed cases while panel B
includes the results of death cases. To avoid small coefficients, we divide EIU, UHC, and No. of Days values by 100 for all models. Sample sizes vary due
to missing values. All models are estimated using OLS regression. P-values for an one-tailed t-test are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variable definitions are in Appendix A2.
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Table 6: Robustness Results II
1
Variable
EIU
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
ln(GDP)
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
HE GDP
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
UHC
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
Panel A. Confirmed Cases
Chi-squared Kuiper M D
−8.73 −0.01 0.10 −0.05*
(0.19) (0.48) (0.38) (0.45)
0.92 0.02 0.03 0.02*
(0.25) (0.37) (0.22) (0.31)
−5.53 0.27 −0.18 −0.43*
(0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.46)
162 162 162 162
−0.99% −1.81% −1.48% −1.72%
−3.42*** −0.10** −0.06 −0.10**
(0.01) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03)
−1.65* −0.09*** −0.08** −0.09***
(0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
81.84 3.55 2.78 3.01*
(0.26) (0.21) (0.27) (0.25)
176 176 176 176
2.05% 2.93% 1.16% 2.72%
−2.12*** −0.06** −0.05** −0.05**
(0.00) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
−0.86 −0.07** −0.07** −0.07**
(0.20) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
15.25 1.60 1.64 1.12*
(0.45) (0.36) (0.35) (0.40)
173 173 173 173
2.83% 3.24% 2.14% 2.66%
−31.48*** −0.60* −0.45 −0.71*
(0.01) (0.09) (0.16) (0.06)
−1.17 −0.07** −0.06* −0.07**
(0.15) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04)
65.84 2.63 2.21 2.16*
(0.30) (0.27) (0.31) (0.31)
174 174 174 174
1.89% 1.18% 0.04% 1.21%
Panel B. Death Cases
Chi-squared Kuiper M D
−29.44** −1.46*** −1.13*** −1.29***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−5.86*** −0.21*** −0.18*** −0.20***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
84.18*** 2.18*** 1.42** 2.12***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
139 139 139 139
13.83% 21.12% 13.39% 18.89%
−6.59*** −0.28*** −0.24*** −0.27***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−6.18*** −0.25*** −0.19*** −0.23***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
67.31*** 1.48** 0.91 1.48**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.12) (0.03)
147 147 147 147
17.49% 28.60% 17.36% 24.63%
−3.45*** −0.13*** −0.14*** −0.14***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−4.73*** −0.19*** −0.14*** −0.17***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
72.71*** 1.75*** 0.96 1.66**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01)
143 143 143 143
15.96% 25.29% 18.77% 22.82%
−61.57*** −2.61*** −2.35*** −2.53***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−6.30*** −0.23*** −0.19*** −0.22***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
80.12*** 2.11*** 1.35** 2.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
146 146 146 146
18.65% 28.99% 20.84% 26.99%
This table presents the second robustness results using 45 days since the first case in each country as cutoff days and re-estimate equation 6. Panel A
shows the results of confirmed cases while panel B includes the results of death cases. To avoid small coefficients, we divide EIU, UHC, and No. of Days
values by 100 for all models. Sample sizes vary due to missing values. All models are estimated using OLS regression. P-values for an one-tailed t-test are
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variable definitions are in Appendix A2.
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Table 7: Results for 50 Countries with Regional Data
1
Variable
EIU
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
ln(GDP)
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
HE GDP
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
UHC
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
Panel A. Confirmed Cases
Chi-squared Kuiper M D
27.37 0.09 0.29 0.34*
(0.37) (0.46) (0.37) (0.38)
1.60 0.01 0.03 0.02*
(0.44) (0.49) (0.41) (0.44)
3.56** 0.04** 0.03** 0.05**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02)
50 50 50 50
5.09% 3.55% 2.64% 6.39%
−21.00* −0.36** −0.16 −0.25
(0.09) (0.04) (0.17) (0.13)
−2.05 −0.04 0.00 −0.02*
(0.42) (0.38) (0.48) (0.44)
2.42* 0.03 0.02 0.04*
(0.10) (0.15) (0.12) (0.07)
50 50 50 50
8.43% 9.61% 4.30% 8.85%
−6.08 −0.15** −0.10** −0.11*
(0.13) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06)
1.36 0.01 0.02 0.02*
(0.45) (0.46) (0.43) (0.46)
2.58* 0.02 0.02 0.03*
(0.09) (0.18) (0.19) (0.09)
49 49 49 49
7.15% 12.07% 7.79% 10.38%
−301.29** −4.29** −2.21 −3.37*
(0.03) (0.02) (0.11) (0.06)
−0.44 −0.01 0.01 0.00*
(0.48) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49)
2.61* 0.03* 0.03* 0.04**
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05)
50 50 50 50
11.70% 11.69% 5.67% 10.86%
Panel B. Death Cases
Chi-squared Kuiper M D
−220.31*** −4.74*** −3.64*** −4.51***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
13.16 0.23 0.02 0.13*
(0.14) (0.13) (0.44) (0.25)
−1.77 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02*
(0.26) (0.38) (0.32) (0.35)
30 30 30 30
19.78% 32.99% 23.23% 27.44%
−52.00*** −0.78*** −0.36* −0.70**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01)
15.52* 0.32* 0.13 0.23
(0.09) (0.06) (0.23) (0.13)
−3.35 −0.03 −0.02 −0.03*
(0.10) (0.26) (0.33) (0.25)
30 30 30 30
28.71% 25.12% 0.90% 16.75%
−19.65*** −0.34*** −0.20** −0.31***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
19.45* 0.38** 0.15 0.28*
(0.05) (0.03) (0.19) (0.08)
−4.09* −0.05 −0.03 −0.05
(0.07) (0.15) (0.21) (0.15)
29 29 29 29
31.47% 34.29% 11.57% 25.88%
−639.03*** −9.79*** −4.42** −8.42***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
17.61** 0.35** 0.14 0.26*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.20) (0.09)
−2.15 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02*
(0.17) (0.37) (0.40) (0.36)
30 30 30 30
45.25% 38.17% 5.52% 26.45%
This table presents the results using equation 6 with regional data from 50 selected countries. Panel A shows the results of confirmed cases while panel B
includes the results of death cases. To avoid small coefficients, we divide EIU, UHC, and No. of Days values by 100 for all models. Sample sizes vary due
to missing values. All models are estimated using OLS regression. P-values for an one-tailed t-test are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variable definitions are in Appendix A2.
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Table 8: Second Digit Tests
1
Variable
EIU
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
ln(GDP)
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
HE GDP
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
UHC
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
Panel A. Confirmed Cases
Chi-squared Kuiper M D
−6.72 −0.30* −0.20 −0.36**
(0.22) (0.09) (0.17) (0.05)
−2.39** −0.06** −0.05* −0.06**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
−1.66 −0.27* −0.18 −0.21
(0.42) (0.09) (0.17) (0.13)
159 159 159 159
1.02% 3.79% 2.09% 4.29%
−2.41** −0.08*** −0.07** −0.09***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
−1.83** −0.06** −0.05** −0.05**
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
0.13 −0.23 −0.13 −0.14*
(0.49) (0.12) (0.22) (0.23)
170 170 170 170
1.74% 5.82% 4.08% 5.51%
−0.21 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01*
(0.39) (0.10) (0.22) (0.26)
−1.34 −0.04* −0.03* −0.03
(0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11)
−1.46 −0.29* −0.19 −0.21
(0.42) (0.07) (0.14) (0.13)
167 167 167 167
−0.30% 3.97% 1.94% 1.81%
−13.32 −0.57** −0.45** −0.66***
(0.12) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01)
−1.93** −0.06** −0.05** −0.05**
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
−0.24 −0.22 −0.15 −0.15*
(0.49) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20)
169 169 169 169
1.01% 4.90% 3.37% 5.35%
Panel B. Death Cases
Chi-squared Kuiper M D
−17.49* −0.65** −0.53** −0.64***
(0.06) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
−2.15 −0.08** −0.06* −0.07**
(0.12) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05)
−6.39 −0.52** −0.31 −0.31
(0.27) (0.02) (0.11) (0.12)
113 113 113 113
1.59% 10.24% 4.73% 6.88%
−2.48** −0.11*** −0.09*** −0.10***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−2.50** −0.10*** −0.08*** −0.09***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−9.65* −0.60*** −0.40** −0.37**
(0.10) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
116 116 116 116
7.48% 20.22% 13.76% 15.66%
−2.14*** −0.07*** −0.06*** −0.07***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
−1.98 −0.08** −0.07** −0.07**
(0.10) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
−8.13 −0.59** −0.38* −0.35*
(0.21) (0.01) (0.07) (0.08)
115 115 115 115
5.19% 15.88% 9.16% 11.63%
−5.42 −0.57* −0.41 −0.51*
(0.35) (0.06) (0.13) (0.08)
−2.47* −0.10** −0.09** −0.09**
(0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
−3.98 −0.45** −0.25 −0.22
(0.35) (0.04) (0.16) (0.20)
117 117 117 117
0.38% 10.32% 5.29% 5.89%
This table presents the results of equation 6 using second-digit goodness-of-fit measures. Panel A shows the results of confirmed cases while panel B
includes the results of death cases. To avoid small coefficients, we divide EIU, UHC, and No. of Days values by 100 for all models. Sample sizes vary due
to missing values. All models are estimated using OLS regression. P-values for an one-tailed t-test are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variable definitions are in Appendix A2.
27
Table 9: Swine Flu Pandemic 2009-2010
1
Variable
EIU
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
ln(GDP)
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
HE GDP
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
UHC
1*
()
ln(Population)
1*
()
No. of Days
1*
()
Sample Size
Adj. R2
Panel A. Confirmed Cases
Chi-squared Kuiper M D
−0.21** 0.00 −0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.43) (0.11) (0.46)
−2.55* 0.05 −0.08 0.02
(0.07) (0.35) (0.18) (0.37)
3.53*** −0.02 0.11* −0.02
(0.01) (0.44) (0.07) (0.32)
26 26 26 26
21.51% −11.47% 1.32% −11.01%
−2.18** −0.05 −0.03 −0.02
(0.02) (0.25) (0.32) (0.32)
−1.19 0.01 −0.04 −0.01*
(0.13) (0.44) (0.27) (0.39)
2.47*** −0.01 0.04 −0.02
(0.01) (0.45) (0.27) (0.34)
35 35 35 35
35.78% −7.44% −8.02% 3.65%
−0.56 −0.05* −0.04* −0.02
(0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.20)
−0.25 0.04 −0.02 0.00*
(0.40) (0.28) (0.37) (0.49)
1.90** −0.01 0.04 −0.02
(0.03) (0.42) (0.25) (0.31)
35 35 35 35
29.82% −2.05% −2.79% 5.13%
−0.09 −0.01* 0.00 0.00
(0.27) (0.10) (0.30) (0.24)
−0.78 −0.02 −0.07 −0.03*
(0.26) (0.40) (0.18) (0.26)
2.25** 0.03 0.07 0.00
(0.03) (0.36) (0.17) (0.50)
33 33 33 33
28.35% −3.93% −6.77% 4.94%
Panel B. Death Cases
Chi-squared Kuiper M D
−0.25** −0.01 0.00 −0.01
(0.04) (0.10) (0.35) (0.17)
−2.89** −0.23*** −0.13** −0.13**
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
1.01*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
23 23 23 23
47.95% 45.96% 19.61% 33.05%
−1.97 −0.16** −0.06 −0.12*
(0.14) (0.03) (0.19) (0.05)
−1.56* −0.16*** −0.08** −0.07**
(0.08) (0.00) (0.03) (0.04)
0.93*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
26 26 26 26
41.60% 43.23% 16.95% 34.09%
0.04 −0.05* 0.01 −0.01
(0.48) (0.09) (0.38) (0.41)
−1.33 −0.13*** −0.08** −0.06*
(0.12) (0.01) (0.04) (0.10)
0.86*** 0.05*** 0.02** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
26 26 26 26
38.29% 37.76% 14.38% 25.50%
−0.04 −0.03*** −0.02** −0.02**
(0.45) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
−1.93* −0.20*** −0.11** −0.10**
(0.07) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
0.93*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
25 25 25 25
38.94% 52.47% 29.49% 37.89%
This table presents the results of 2009-2010 Swine Flu Pandemic analysis. Panel A shows the results of confirmed cases while panel B includes the results of
death cases. To avoid small coefficients, we divide EIU, UHC, and No. of Days values by 100 for all models. Sample sizes vary due to missing values. All
models are estimated using OLS regression. P-values for an one-tailed t-test are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively. All variable definitions are in Appendix A2.
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Appendix A1
Table A1: Original Data
Country Pop. EIU GDP HE GDP UHC Cutoff Tot C. Tot D. Days C. Chi C. K C. M C. D C. Days D. Chi D. K D. M D. D D.
Afghanistan 17.48 28.50 6.32 11.78 37.00 2020-06-05 20917 369 103 12.04 1.41 1.18 1.47 76 8.17 1.04 0.42 0.89
Albania* 14.87 58.90 8.42 - 59.00 2020-04-25 1263 34 48 16.07 1.71 0.93 1.38 46 60.22 2.89 2.79 3.03
Algeria* 17.60 40.10 8.31 6.37 78.00 2020-05-26 10265 715 92 4.24 0.73 0.49 0.67 76 57.57 3.06 1.68 2.52
Andorra 11.25 - 10.57 10.32 - 2020-03-30 852 51 29 18.48 1.79 1.72 1.93 9 8.74 0.67 0.63 1.05
Angola 17.31 37.20 8.32 2.79 40.00 2020-05-30 92 4 72 12.66 1.20 0.79 1.18 63 176.01 5.02 4.90 5.58
Antigua and Barbuda 11.49 - 9.64 4.53 73.00 2020-04-07 26 3 26 38.86 2.27 1.41 2.13 1 2.32 0.98 0.70 0.75
Argentina* 17.63 70.20 9.59 9.12 76.00 2020-06-08 23620 693 98 1.90 0.57 0.56 0.61 93 9.89 1.42 0.62 1.06
Armenia 14.90 55.40 8.27 10.36 69.00 2020-06-07 13325 211 99 11.62 1.52 1.02 1.33 74 6.92 0.57 0.45 0.76
Australia* 17.05 90.90 10.90 9.21 87.00 2020-03-30 7267 103 65 18.15 1.83 1.79 1.96 30 15.94 0.99 0.96 1.26
Austria* 16.01 82.90 10.77 10.40 79.00 2020-03-28 16968 672 33 2.64 0.44 0.38 0.61 17 5.69 0.70 0.45 0.65
Azerbaijan 16.13 27.50 8.33 6.65 65.00 2020-06-08 7876 93 100 2.73 0.46 0.31 0.42 88 5.32 0.87 0.37 0.74
Bahamas 12.88 - 10.37 5.76 75.00 2020-04-26 103 11 42 18.08 1.65 1.07 1.43 26 61.95 2.34 1.31 1.98
Bahrain 14.34 25.50 10.07 4.75 77.00 2020-06-06 15417 27 104 4.13 0.76 0.52 0.72 83 76.12 2.12 1.62 2.33
Bangladesh 18.92 58.80 7.35 2.27 48.00 2020-06-08 68504 930 93 15.32 1.67 0.83 1.39 83 8.14 0.88 0.71 0.84
Barbados 12.57 - 9.77 6.78 77.00 2020-04-07 92 7 22 12.66 1.12 0.69 1.01 3 2.67 0.81 0.36 0.54
Belarus 16.06 24.80 8.66 5.93 76.00 2020-05-17 49453 276 80 11.11 1.15 0.45 0.95 48 7.99 1.25 0.80 1.20
Belgium* 16.27 76.40 10.70 10.34 84.00 2020-04-15 59348 9606 72 30.20 2.49 2.28 2.48 36 8.23 1.03 0.75 0.94
Belize 12.89 - 8.49 5.64 64.00 2020-04-13 19 2 22 3.18 0.53 0.31 0.54 8 10.00 1.60 0.92 1.23
Benin 16.31 50.90 7.04 3.72 40.00 2020-05-12 339 4 58 48.45 1.67 1.37 2.23 37 41.22 3.28 2.28 2.76
Bhutan 13.56 53.00 8.10 3.19 62.00 2020-06-02 59 0 89 71.54 2.25 1.36 2.46 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Bolivia 16.27 48.40 8.12 6.44 68.00 2020-06-05 13949 475 87 1.95 0.59 0.52 0.58 69 2.74 0.71 0.29 0.51
Bosnia and Herzegovina 15.00 48.60 8.59 8.93 61.00 2020-04-04 2704 160 31 2.95 0.68 0.38 0.60 15 6.88 0.95 0.90 1.10
Botswana 14.67 78.10 8.97 6.13 61.00 2020-05-24 42 1 56 71.53 3.17 3.09 3.37 55 127.71 5.31 5.18 5.57
Brazil* 19.17 68.60 9.20 9.47 79.00 2020-06-08 707412 37134 104 5.32 0.94 0.36 0.68 84 6.48 1.05 0.68 0.87
Brunei 12.99 - 10.26 2.37 81.00 2020-03-19 141 2 11 8.76 0.89 0.64 0.94 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Bulgaria 15.75 70.30 9.02 8.10 66.00 2020-04-27 2810 164 51 11.79 1.68 0.89 1.26 48 21.91 2.09 1.08 1.75
Burkina Faso 16.85 40.40 6.47 6.92 40.00 2020-04-11 890 53 33 14.09 1.78 0.90 1.34 25 14.89 1.47 1.29 1.59
Burundi 16.29 21.50 5.68 7.52 42.00 2020-05-18 83 1 49 39.04 1.59 1.46 2.21 36 83.59 4.33 4.19 4.50
Cabo Verde 13.23 77.80 8.10 5.17 69.00 2020-06-05 567 5 78 23.74 2.17 1.07 1.82 74 29.70 2.19 1.94 2.19
Cambodia 16.63 35.30 7.23 5.92 60.00 2020-03-23 126 0 57 51.46 3.24 3.16 3.45 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Cameroon 17.09 28.50 7.26 4.67 46.00 2020-06-07 8060 212 94 8.70 0.78 0.77 1.18 75 31.70 1.77 1.67 2.20
Canada* 17.45 92.20 10.72 10.57 89.00 2020-04-22 97779 7910 88 18.05 1.13 0.84 1.23 45 5.53 0.99 0.96 1.10
Central African Republic 15.39 13.20 6.11 5.82 33.00 2020-06-08 1850 5 86 48.37 1.96 1.63 2.46 17 17.70 1.28 0.81 1.42
Chad 16.61 16.10 6.50 4.49 28.00 2020-05-09 839 70 52 11.67 0.93 0.90 1.10 12 7.37 1.01 0.54 0.91
Chile* 16.77 80.80 9.62 8.98 70.00 2020-06-07 138846 2264 97 3.90 0.64 0.42 0.62 78 2.09 0.52 0.23 0.39
China* 21.09 22.60 9.08 5.15 79.00 2020-02-14 84635 4645 22 5.49 0.72 0.56 0.82 22 1.71 0.36 0.19 0.39
Colombia* 17.74 71.30 8.76 7.23 76.00 2020-06-08 40847 1373 95 5.07 0.88 0.34 0.68 79 3.55 0.61 0.33 0.55
Comoros 13.67 31.50 7.19 7.38 52.00 2020-05-24 141 2 25 24.25 1.58 1.09 1.78 19 44.12 3.19 3.05 3.27
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Congo (Brazzaville) 15.52 31.10 7.44 2.93 39.00 2020-05-27 683 22 74 40.53 2.44 1.38 1.97 56 51.47 2.64 1.01 2.31
Congo (Kinshasa) 18.31 31.10 7.44 2.93 39.00 2020-06-04 4106 88 86 9.23 1.11 0.63 0.98 76 46.33 1.90 1.37 2.25
Costa Rica 15.44 81.30 9.37 7.33 77.00 2020-06-07 1342 11 94 50.60 2.96 1.06 2.15 81 51.30 1.65 1.62 1.91
Cote d’Ivoire - 40.50 7.35 4.45 47.00 2020-06-08 3881 38 90 17.40 1.82 1.04 1.56 72 38.40 2.25 1.65 2.02
Croatia* 15.23 65.70 9.50 6.79 71.00 2020-04-01 2247 104 37 5.48 0.77 0.74 0.86 14 17.89 1.04 0.82 1.38
Cuba 16.24 28.40 9.05 11.71 83.00 2020-04-13 2200 83 33 9.19 1.25 0.68 1.05 27 15.94 1.38 1.13 1.48
Cyprus 14.00 75.90 10.18 6.68 78.00 2020-04-04 970 18 27 7.84 0.66 0.42 0.81 14 9.39 0.73 0.66 1.03
Czechia* 16.19 76.90 9.92 7.23 76.00 2020-04-02 9697 328 33 11.43 1.07 0.85 1.04 12 8.29 0.68 0.43 0.79
Denmark* 15.57 92.20 10.95 10.11 81.00 2020-04-08 12162 593 42 4.62 0.73 0.38 0.57 26 2.99 0.40 0.26 0.47
Djibouti 13.80 27.70 7.98 3.32 47.00 2020-06-02 4278 31 77 27.68 2.36 2.03 2.27 54 66.41 3.31 2.92 3.28
Dominica 11.18 - 8.89 5.88 - 2020-03-26 18 0 5 5.65 0.92 0.50 0.78 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Dominican Republic 16.20 65.40 8.94 6.14 74.00 2020-06-08 20126 539 100 17.83 1.62 1.59 1.89 84 37.39 2.66 1.34 2.13
Ecuador* 16.68 63.30 8.73 8.26 77.00 2020-04-24 43378 3642 55 16.66 1.51 0.87 1.40 42 12.17 1.58 0.72 1.19
Egypt 18.44 30.60 7.80 5.29 68.00 2020-06-06 35444 1271 114 8.39 1.30 1.19 1.30 91 5.69 1.06 0.46 0.79
El Salvador 15.68 61.50 8.27 7.23 76.00 2020-06-02 3104 56 76 6.49 1.14 0.59 0.90 64 19.11 1.47 0.75 1.42
Equatorial Guinea 14.15 19.20 9.18 3.11 45.00 2020-05-19 1306 12 66 4.90 0.74 0.69 0.81 28 30.99 1.26 0.93 1.75
Eritrea 15.08 23.70 - 2.87 38.00 2020-04-04 39 0 15 12.23 1.05 0.90 1.24 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Estonia* 14.10 79.00 9.92 6.43 75.00 2020-04-05 1940 69 39 6.30 0.75 0.68 0.91 12 10.30 1.35 1.27 1.47
Eswatini 13.96 31.40 8.28 6.93 63.00 2020-05-01 340 3 49 47.41 2.35 1.25 1.92 16 37.15 2.95 2.80 3.00
Ethiopia 18.56 34.40 6.64 3.50 39.00 2020-06-08 2156 27 88 10.52 1.46 1.33 1.49 65 80.47 3.35 2.09 3.16
Fiji 13.71 58.50 8.72 3.50 64.00 2020-04-07 18 0 20 33.20 1.50 1.43 1.67 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Finland* 15.53 92.50 10.74 9.21 78.00 2020-04-10 7001 323 73 29.69 2.39 2.34 2.54 21 4.55 0.77 0.58 0.76
France* 17.99 81.20 10.56 11.31 78.00 2020-04-16 192330 29212 84 14.46 1.38 0.84 1.36 62 14.98 1.73 1.69 1.85
Gabon 14.61 36.10 8.88 2.78 49.00 2020-05-29 3101 21 77 7.04 0.96 0.78 0.96 71 63.04 3.49 3.40 3.81
Gambia 14.70 43.30 6.52 3.28 44.00 2020-05-08 28 1 53 49.67 2.06 1.24 2.29 47 109.13 4.92 4.79 5.15
Georgia 15.20 54.20 8.38 7.60 66.00 2020-04-18 812 13 53 13.80 1.16 1.01 1.19 15 51.99 2.49 2.36 2.59
Germany* 18.24 86.80 10.70 11.25 83.00 2020-04-02 186109 8695 67 20.67 1.85 1.81 2.10 25 6.72 0.72 0.51 0.82
Ghana 17.25 66.30 7.61 3.26 47.00 2020-05-14 9910 48 62 6.18 0.73 0.39 0.74 55 32.70 1.51 0.93 1.60
Greece* 16.16 74.30 9.85 8.04 75.00 2020-04-02 3049 182 37 20.91 1.47 0.91 1.45 23 7.84 0.99 0.45 0.76
Grenada 11.63 - 9.23 4.76 72.00 2020-03-29 23 0 8 20.77 1.67 0.90 1.31 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Guatemala 16.70 52.60 8.41 5.81 55.00 2020-06-08 7502 267 87 7.50 1.01 0.56 0.85 85 15.96 1.38 1.35 1.59
Guinea 16.39 31.40 6.75 4.12 37.00 2020-06-03 4216 23 83 12.79 1.46 0.73 1.15 50 27.73 1.60 0.86 1.59
Guinea-Bissau 14.49 26.30 6.60 7.24 40.00 2020-05-10 1389 12 47 21.88 1.89 1.48 1.85 15 12.69 1.63 1.42 1.56
Guyana 13.58 61.50 8.43 4.95 72.00 2020-04-17 154 12 37 14.40 1.42 0.68 1.20 37 43.71 1.64 1.29 2.19
Haiti 16.25 45.70 6.64 8.04 49.00 2020-06-04 3538 54 77 24.63 1.35 0.80 1.35 61 13.66 1.41 0.82 1.27
Holy See - - - - - 2020-03-28 12 0 23 31.62 2.41 2.31 2.62 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Honduras 16.11 54.20 7.81 7.86 65.00 2020-05-27 6450 262 78 16.17 1.96 1.07 1.65 63 9.93 1.16 1.14 1.36
Hungary* 16.08 66.30 9.58 6.88 74.00 2020-04-13 4014 548 41 3.38 0.59 0.35 0.55 30 4.34 0.87 0.72 0.90
Iceland 12.74 95.80 11.17 8.33 84.00 2020-04-02 1807 10 35 6.22 0.86 0.53 0.87 17 18.44 1.76 1.46 1.64
India* 21.04 69.00 7.59 3.53 55.00 2020-06-08 265928 7473 131 44.85 2.19 2.15 2.32 90 7.06 1.27 0.85 1.06
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Indonesia* 19.43 64.80 8.25 2.99 57.00 2020-06-08 32033 1883 99 9.29 1.31 0.96 1.16 90 20.75 2.02 1.36 1.95
Iran* 18.25 23.80 8.64 8.66 72.00 2020-04-02 173832 8351 44 4.16 0.62 0.49 0.66 44 3.68 0.78 0.64 0.74
Iraq 17.51 37.40 8.56 4.17 61.00 2020-06-08 13481 370 106 6.01 0.81 0.49 0.80 97 26.40 1.99 0.82 1.47
Ireland* 15.41 92.40 11.15 7.18 76.00 2020-04-16 25207 1683 48 3.85 0.50 0.37 0.62 37 7.17 1.23 0.57 0.99
Israel 16.03 78.60 10.61 7.41 82.00 2020-04-03 18032 298 43 6.48 0.57 0.38 0.63 14 4.57 0.79 0.74 0.85
Italy* 17.92 75.20 10.38 8.84 82.00 2020-03-26 235278 33964 56 30.64 2.21 1.60 2.18 35 2.70 0.32 0.27 0.41
Jamaica 14.90 69.60 8.53 5.99 65.00 2020-04-26 599 10 47 6.08 0.49 0.42 0.65 39 17.50 1.55 1.10 1.43
Japan* 18.66 79.90 10.55 10.94 83.00 2020-04-18 17060 920 88 15.46 1.25 1.23 1.57 66 18.13 1.24 0.77 1.33
Jordan 16.14 39.30 8.33 8.12 76.00 2020-03-28 831 9 26 21.03 1.97 1.80 2.02 2 4.64 1.22 0.99 1.06
Kazakhstan* 16.75 29.40 9.13 3.13 76.00 2020-06-03 12859 56 83 11.99 1.63 0.88 1.33 71 54.61 2.50 2.27 2.48
Kenya 17.80 51.80 7.36 4.80 55.00 2020-06-08 2872 85 88 9.58 0.98 0.53 0.94 75 15.72 1.40 0.82 1.22
Kosovo - - 8.28 - - 2020-04-20 1263 31 26 6.44 0.81 0.43 0.75 26 26.88 2.27 1.80 2.23
Kuwait 15.27 39.30 10.30 5.29 76.00 2020-05-22 32510 269 89 6.87 0.95 0.87 1.13 49 5.57 0.92 0.89 1.05
Kyrgyzstan 15.69 48.90 7.13 6.19 70.00 2020-06-01 2032 23 76 13.80 1.63 1.05 1.59 60 59.26 2.63 1.93 2.87
Laos 15.80 21.40 7.79 2.53 51.00 2020-03-28 19 0 5 13.60 1.06 0.74 1.12 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Latvia* 14.45 74.90 9.65 5.96 71.00 2020-04-01 1088 26 31 8.77 1.18 0.84 1.10 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Lebanon 15.74 43.60 8.97 8.20 73.00 2020-03-27 1350 30 36 10.29 1.43 1.03 1.25 18 35.69 2.48 1.36 2.18
Lesotho 14.58 65.40 7.11 8.76 48.00 2020-06-03 4 0 22 27.87 2.34 1.73 2.02 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Liberia 15.43 54.50 6.55 8.16 39.00 2020-06-08 370 30 85 32.09 2.30 1.13 1.89 66 46.40 2.44 2.39 2.75
Libya 15.74 20.20 8.66 - 64.00 2020-06-08 332 5 77 113.06 2.84 2.60 2.86 68 70.34 2.42 2.24 2.71
Liechtenstein 10.55 - - - - 2020-03-23 82 1 20 6.90 0.94 0.89 1.04 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Lithuania 14.82 75.00 9.73 6.46 73.00 2020-04-04 1720 71 37 5.32 0.82 0.80 0.93 15 13.90 1.28 0.55 1.02
Luxembourg 13.35 88.10 11.58 5.48 83.00 2020-03-28 4040 110 29 7.35 0.82 0.79 1.04 15 30.14 1.64 1.09 1.41
Madagascar 17.13 56.40 6.24 5.50 28.00 2020-06-04 1094 9 77 12.67 1.62 1.35 1.63 19 32.81 1.60 1.53 2.09
Malawi 16.77 55.00 5.88 9.65 46.00 2020-06-03 443 4 63 17.30 1.67 1.02 1.50 58 117.60 4.16 3.25 3.91
Malaysia* 17.29 71.60 9.24 3.86 73.00 2020-04-08 8329 117 75 18.67 1.53 1.36 1.56 23 12.90 1.63 0.82 1.26
Maldives 13.20 - 9.16 9.03 62.00 2020-06-01 1916 8 86 38.69 2.83 2.60 2.93 34 43.76 2.62 1.66 2.12
Mali 16.82 49.20 6.72 3.79 38.00 2020-06-02 1547 92 70 4.96 0.87 0.52 0.71 66 28.53 1.80 1.09 1.65
Malta 13.00 79.50 10.21 9.34 82.00 2020-04-11 630 9 36 11.56 1.26 0.75 1.10 4 4.51 1.02 0.65 0.78
Mauritania 15.35 39.20 7.04 4.40 41.00 2020-06-07 1104 59 86 108.53 3.61 1.83 3.01 70 49.76 3.17 3.10 3.35
Mauritius 14.06 82.20 9.26 5.72 63.00 2020-04-09 337 10 23 6.78 1.12 0.64 0.91 20 52.24 1.63 1.53 2.13
Mexico* 18.67 60.90 9.14 5.52 76.00 2020-06-08 120102 14053 102 10.09 1.35 0.59 1.06 82 2.46 0.49 0.25 0.42
Moldova 15.21 57.50 8.16 7.01 69.00 2020-06-07 9807 353 92 10.57 1.48 1.22 1.39 82 16.93 1.79 1.17 1.52
Monaco 10.58 - 12.03 1.77 - 2020-03-27 99 4 28 16.56 1.50 1.05 1.44 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Mongolia 15.00 65.00 8.21 4.00 62.00 2020-05-18 194 0 70 48.69 1.84 1.55 2.70 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Montenegro 13.35 56.50 8.96 - 68.00 2020-04-06 324 9 21 9.55 1.13 0.72 0.99 15 17.72 2.14 1.13 1.65
Morocco 17.42 51.00 8.02 5.25 70.00 2020-04-22 8302 208 52 7.75 0.88 0.67 0.91 44 9.04 1.36 1.17 1.30
Mozambique 17.26 36.50 6.13 4.94 46.00 2020-06-08 433 2 79 29.29 1.42 0.78 1.33 15 41.51 2.55 2.42 2.58
Myanmar 17.81 35.50 7.13 4.66 61.00 2020-04-19 244 6 24 16.54 1.11 0.97 1.37 20 18.13 1.40 0.91 1.42
Namibia 14.75 64.30 8.64 8.55 62.00 2020-03-29 31 0 16 17.04 1.20 0.95 1.43 0 - - 0.00 0.00
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Nepal 17.19 52.80 6.82 5.55 48.00 2020-06-08 3762 14 136 46.90 3.03 2.75 3.13 24 5.23 0.40 0.36 0.61
Netherlands* 16.66 90.10 10.79 10.10 86.00 2020-04-14 47945 6035 48 5.79 1.10 0.66 0.92 40 8.48 1.13 0.78 1.02
New Zealand 15.43 92.60 10.65 9.17 87.00 2020-04-05 1504 22 38 19.42 1.22 1.13 1.29 8 18.58 2.14 1.98 2.12
Nicaragua 15.71 35.50 7.68 8.65 73.00 2020-05-26 1118 46 69 24.82 2.08 1.07 1.73 61 35.48 1.54 1.36 2.07
Niger 17.00 32.90 5.93 7.74 37.00 2020-04-11 973 65 23 5.99 0.85 0.43 0.76 18 17.75 1.63 1.55 1.86
Nigeria 19.14 41.20 7.59 3.76 42.00 2020-06-04 12801 361 98 4.11 0.39 0.38 0.61 74 12.69 1.74 0.93 1.38
North Macedonia 14.55 59.70 8.60 6.06 72.00 2020-06-08 3152 156 104 35.12 2.56 2.52 2.73 79 22.16 1.67 1.00 1.46
Norway* 15.51 98.70 11.23 10.45 87.00 2020-03-29 8561 239 33 3.38 0.77 0.71 0.78 16 16.79 0.81 0.77 1.10
Oman 15.44 30.60 9.62 3.85 69.00 2020-06-06 17486 81 104 4.57 0.84 0.56 0.83 68 7.20 0.93 0.55 0.90
Pakistan* 19.21 42.50 7.29 2.90 45.00 2020-06-08 108317 2172 104 11.40 1.33 0.91 1.24 82 5.15 0.75 0.47 0.65
Palestine 15.44 38.90 8.09 - - 2020-04-07 473 3 34 6.81 1.02 0.47 0.80 13 30.19 2.68 2.52 2.71
Panama 15.28 70.50 9.63 7.32 79.00 2020-06-08 16854 398 91 14.82 1.43 0.95 1.22 90 21.80 2.02 1.03 1.55
Papua New Guinea 16.01 60.30 7.90 2.47 40.00 2020-04-22 8 0 34 29.77 2.22 1.16 1.90 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Paraguay 15.78 62.40 8.64 6.65 69.00 2020-05-09 1145 11 63 9.84 0.78 0.62 0.99 50 40.69 1.47 1.10 1.89
Peru* 17.31 66.00 8.81 5.00 77.00 2020-06-01 199696 5571 88 6.34 1.09 0.80 1.07 74 4.53 0.56 0.44 0.63
Philippines* 18.51 66.40 8.00 4.45 61.00 2020-06-04 22474 1011 127 37.35 1.90 1.88 2.15 124 35.11 2.60 1.42 2.26
Poland* 17.45 66.20 9.54 6.54 75.00 2020-06-08 27160 1166 97 19.92 2.14 1.20 1.82 89 21.07 1.53 0.92 1.32
Portugal* 16.14 80.30 9.97 8.97 82.00 2020-04-03 34885 1485 33 5.07 0.77 0.68 0.87 18 5.49 0.84 0.61 0.82
Qatar 14.85 31.90 11.02 2.61 68.00 2020-06-03 70158 57 96 14.14 1.37 1.01 1.38 68 19.86 1.68 1.64 1.95
Romania* 16.77 64.90 9.29 5.16 74.00 2020-04-17 20604 1339 52 4.42 0.83 0.51 0.82 27 7.23 0.97 0.70 0.88
Russia* 18.80 31.10 9.28 5.34 74.00 2020-05-12 476043 5963 103 43.33 2.49 2.45 2.63 55 6.29 0.96 0.87 1.13
Rwanda 16.38 31.60 6.64 6.57 57.00 2020-04-30 451 2 48 27.79 2.24 1.96 2.30 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Saint Kitts and Nevis 10.88 - 9.86 5.04 - 2020-03-31 15 0 7 18.54 1.56 1.42 1.74 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Saint Lucia 12.12 - 9.21 4.55 68.00 2020-04-04 19 0 22 17.03 1.72 0.88 1.38 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 11.62 - 8.88 4.49 71.00 2020-04-09 27 0 27 31.36 2.54 2.28 2.58 0 - - 0.00 0.00
San Marino 10.43 - 10.79 7.36 - 2020-04-22 687 42 56 17.08 1.60 1.09 1.37 51 44.50 2.68 1.91 2.32
Sao Tome and Principe 12.30 - 7.50 6.23 55.00 2020-05-31 513 12 56 129.38 3.39 3.02 3.76 31 29.65 1.69 0.98 1.55
Saudi Arabia* 17.36 19.30 9.94 5.23 74.00 2020-05-22 105283 746 82 7.48 0.92 0.50 0.73 60 8.59 1.07 0.57 0.94
Senegal 16.63 58.10 7.22 4.13 45.00 2020-05-16 4427 49 76 14.80 1.39 0.76 1.23 46 39.40 2.11 1.46 1.98
Serbia 15.98 64.10 8.75 8.43 65.00 2020-04-19 11896 250 45 3.44 0.68 0.29 0.55 31 4.16 0.89 0.62 0.84
Seychelles 11.50 - 9.66 5.01 71.00 2020-03-20 11 0 7 7.88 1.15 0.80 1.07 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Sierra Leone 15.89 48.60 6.21 13.42 39.00 2020-05-30 1001 49 61 11.35 1.37 0.56 1.01 38 22.09 1.60 1.19 1.46
Singapore 15.58 60.20 11.01 4.44 86.00 2020-04-26 38296 25 95 12.58 1.33 0.63 1.03 37 9.78 0.87 0.58 0.91
Slovakia 15.51 71.70 9.77 6.74 77.00 2020-04-19 1531 28 44 6.81 0.70 0.52 0.75 14 23.83 1.85 1.75 1.97
Slovenia 14.55 75.00 10.06 8.19 79.00 2020-04-02 1485 109 29 11.85 1.17 0.88 1.14 20 15.02 1.89 1.56 1.76
Somalia 16.58 - 5.73 - 25.00 2020-06-03 2368 84 80 14.31 1.66 1.44 1.70 57 38.97 2.50 1.21 1.97
South Africa* 17.90 72.40 8.72 8.11 69.00 2020-06-08 50879 1080 96 5.88 1.03 0.42 0.75 74 11.68 0.92 0.60 0.96
South Korea* 17.75 80.00 10.30 7.60 86.00 2020-03-04 11852 274 43 13.89 1.55 1.13 1.34 14 7.15 1.22 0.74 1.03
South Sudan 16.23 - - 9.76 31.00 2020-05-27 1604 19 53 41.58 2.13 1.77 2.23 13 51.36 2.18 1.59 2.19
Spain* 17.66 82.90 10.24 8.87 83.00 2020-03-31 241717 28752 60 16.91 1.51 1.48 1.62 29 7.61 0.69 0.50 0.74
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Sri Lanka 16.88 62.70 8.32 3.81 66.00 2020-05-30 1857 11 125 68.03 3.75 3.52 3.94 64 261.49 4.74 2.79 4.12
Sudan 17.59 27.00 8.01 6.34 44.00 2020-05-27 6242 372 76 13.52 1.55 0.75 1.23 76 20.36 2.14 1.39 1.83
Suriname 13.28 69.80 8.59 6.23 71.00 2020-06-07 128 2 86 108.04 4.70 4.54 5.04 66 153.25 5.81 5.68 6.10
Sweden* 16.13 93.90 10.89 11.02 86.00 2020-06-08 45133 4694 130 26.10 2.38 1.57 1.96 90 33.28 2.49 1.24 1.92
Switzerland* 15.97 90.30 11.30 12.35 83.00 2020-03-25 30972 1923 30 3.26 0.44 0.37 0.56 21 6.41 0.92 0.80 1.00
Syria 16.68 14.30 - - 60.00 2020-05-28 144 6 68 70.22 2.98 2.11 2.60 61 127.47 4.68 3.25 4.25
Tajikistan 16.07 19.30 6.69 7.23 68.00 2020-05-21 4609 48 22 4.33 0.81 0.37 0.66 20 15.10 1.88 1.00 1.53
Tanzania 17.90 51.60 6.91 3.65 43.00 2020-04-20 509 21 36 9.62 1.35 0.69 1.14 21 12.86 1.07 1.02 1.47
Thailand* 18.06 63.20 8.79 3.75 80.00 2020-04-03 3119 58 73 25.04 1.92 1.27 1.69 34 41.92 2.97 2.88 3.18
Timor-Leste 14.09 71.90 7.17 3.88 52.00 2020-04-20 24 0 30 33.10 2.64 2.55 2.75 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Togo 15.93 33.00 6.44 6.20 43.00 2020-05-18 497 13 74 25.78 2.29 1.01 1.62 53 42.35 1.03 1.01 1.91
Trinidad and Tobago 14.15 71.60 9.70 6.98 74.00 2020-03-27 117 8 14 22.08 1.82 1.13 1.61 3 3.32 1.06 0.63 0.78
Tunisia 16.28 67.20 8.16 7.23 70.00 2020-04-06 1087 49 34 5.32 0.49 0.40 0.60 19 8.68 0.83 0.52 0.88
Turkey 18.25 40.90 9.26 4.22 74.00 2020-04-16 171121 4711 37 7.09 0.78 0.41 0.76 31 5.64 0.79 0.62 0.87
Uganda 17.64 50.20 6.45 6.19 45.00 2020-06-02 646 0 74 24.86 1.49 1.18 1.54 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Ukraine* 17.59 59.00 7.88 7.00 68.00 2020-06-07 28077 805 97 17.39 1.94 1.50 1.79 87 16.01 1.60 1.09 1.43
United Arab Emirates 16.11 27.60 10.59 3.33 76.00 2020-05-24 39376 281 117 21.48 1.30 0.98 1.32 66 27.21 1.94 1.89 2.05
United Kingdom* 18.03 85.20 10.61 9.63 87.00 2020-04-14 288834 40680 75 41.99 1.62 1.22 1.71 40 2.92 0.50 0.45 0.52
United States of America* 19.62 79.60 11.00 17.06 84.00 2020-04-10 1960897 110990 80 14.30 1.13 1.11 1.48 42 6.43 0.79 0.67 0.89
Uruguay 15.06 83.80 9.71 9.30 80.00 2020-03-28 845 23 16 1.40 0.50 0.30 0.43 1 2.32 0.98 0.70 0.75
Uzbekistan 17.33 20.10 7.51 6.41 73.00 2020-04-17 4440 18 34 3.41 0.75 0.39 0.67 22 35.64 2.73 1.52 2.29
Venezuela 17.16 28.80 - 1.18 74.00 2020-06-07 2473 22 86 17.73 1.53 0.98 1.52 73 76.57 3.79 2.58 3.23
Vietnam 18.39 30.80 7.77 5.53 75.00 2020-03-28 332 0 66 27.55 2.28 2.23 2.45 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Western Sahara 13.30 - - - - 2020-04-05 9 1 1 9.32 1.26 0.90 0.99 0 - - 0.00 0.00
Yemen 17.21 19.50 6.87 - 42.00 2020-06-05 496 112 57 15.55 1.74 1.57 1.72 37 6.02 0.70 0.68 0.88
Zambia 16.73 50.90 7.34 4.47 53.00 2020-05-14 1200 10 58 12.94 1.36 0.89 1.36 43 43.03 2.05 1.77 2.18
Zimbabwe 16.51 31.60 7.38 6.64 54.00 2020-06-02 287 4 75 32.17 1.94 1.69 2.02 72 213.06 4.82 4.13 4.61
This table shows the original data used for our main analysis from 185 countries. The dataset includes country name, ln(Population), economic indicators (EIU, GDP,
HE GDP, UHC), Cutoff date obtained from each country’s data, total number of confirmed cases (Tot C.), total number of death cases (Tot D.), number of non-zero days
with confirmed case (Days C.), Chi-square, Kuiper, M and D goodness-fit-measures using confirmed case data (Chi C., K C., M C., D C.), number of non-zero days with
death case (Days D.), and Chi-square, Kuiper, M and D goodness-fit-measures using death case data (Chi D., K D., M D., D D.). The * mark is added for 50 countries with
regional data.
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Appendix A2
Table A2: Variable Definitions
Variable Names Definitions
Chi-sq. Conf. Chi-squared statistic based on the cumulative number of confirmed cases, calculated
as in formula 1.
Kuipier Conf. Kuiper statistic based on the cumulative number of confirmed cases, calculated as in
formulae 2 and 3.
M Conf. M-statistic based on the cumulative number of confirmed cases, calculated as in for-
mula 4.
D Conf. D-statistic on the cumulative number of confirmed cases, calculated as in formula 5.
Chi-sq. Death Chi-squared statistic based on the cumulative number of deaths, calculated as in
formula 1.
Kuiper Death Kuiper statistics based on the cumulative number of deaths, calculated as in formula
2 and 3.
M Death L-statistics based on the cumulative number of deaths, calculated as in formula 4.
D Death D-statistics based on the cumulative number of deaths, calculated as in formula 5.
EIU The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index.
GDP per capita Gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of
natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars.
HE GDP Level of current health expenditure (% of GDP). Level of current health expenditure
expressed as a percentage of GDP. Estimates of current health expenditures include
healthcare goods and services consumed during each year. This indicator does not
include capital health expenditures such as buildings, machinery, IT and stocks of
vaccines for emergency or outbreaks.
UHC Coverage index for essential health services. UHC is the coverage index for essential
health services (based on tracer interventions that include reproductive, maternal,
newborn and child health, infectious diseases, noncommunicable diseases and service
capacity and access). It is presented on a scale of 0 to 100.
No of Days Conf. Number of non-zero days of daily new confirmed cases.
No of Days Death. Number of non-zero days for daily new deaths.
Population Population of a country.
Cutoff value The earliest date with the maximum 7-day moving average number of new confirmed
cases for the country.
† The first 8 variables are goodness-of-fit measures: Chi-sq. Conf., Kuipier Conf., M Conf., D Conf., Chi-
sq. Death, Kuiper Death, M Death and D Death. They are calculated with 3 cutoff points: using the
cutoff for the growth part, using 80 days since January 22, 2020, and using 45 calendar days since the
first nonzero case for individual countries. In addition, we apply a so-called “window” approach.
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